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reader was taken aback to realize that
rather than build revulsion, the accumulation of damning evidence created the
same “not my job” effect that allows nations to ignore atrocities against whole
peoples.
Slim describes in detail the “seven
spheres of civilian suffering”: direct violence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and
sexual violence, forced movement, impoverishment, famine and disease, emotional suffering, and postwar suffering.
The book’s most disturbing aspect is the
six chapters that describe the painful details about civilian killing. Only one
chapter is dedicated to promoting civilian protection. This offers practical expressions of philosopher Howard
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing
human minds as Slim’s answer to the dilemma: reason, research, resonance
(emotion and morality), representational redescription (shared identity), resources and rewards, real world events,
and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions
as to how to apply these levers, such as
international criminal courts, fail to resonate with the same passion as the myriad justifications for civilian killing. But
this may be the point: killing results
from the strongest passions, while the
act of sparing life results from the more
enduring, yet more difficult to evoke,
feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.
ROBERT L. PERRY
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Historians are charged with applying
twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents
that, at the time, seem to be only a curious combination of blurring events.
Charles Gati, a leading commentator on
Central European history and politics,
does just that in Failed Illusions, his
study of the abortive Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the Soviet Union.
His book was fifty years in the making,
partly because many of his primary
sources have only recently been made
available. Although he was a firsthand
observer of events in Hungary in the
1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure
that it reflected an appropriate level of
objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the
time of the revolution, having recently
been fired from a state-run newspaper
for no ostensible reason. While this
made him sympathetic to the revolution, he readily admits to a certain
naiveté about why it was happening.
This work is largely a result of his personal quest to retrospectively understand this seminal event that shaped his
life. He emigrated to the United States
shortly after the revolution.
Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary
and the leader of the revolution, is the
story’s protagonist. Through superb usage of primary and personal sources,
Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic
figure. The book’s most profound insights are in its handling of the decision
makers in Moscow and Washington.
Moscow possessed the ultimate power
and was responsible for the decisions
that led to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. However,
Gati’s use of recently opened records
proves conclusively that Soviet leadership was not “trigger happy.” It is eye
opening to see just how close the Soviet
politburo came to allowing Hungary to
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embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The
de-Stalinization theme set by the Twentieth Communist Party Congress of the
Soviet Union in February 1956 made a
major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita
Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and
even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov
seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a
significant degree of autonomy in its interpretation of communism. Were it
not for the massacre of party officials in
Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati argues, the revolution stood an excellent
chance to succeed.
Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Washington. The combined incompetence of
the Central Intelligence Agency; the misguided, provocative propaganda of the
Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Munich; and the White House refusal to focus on the plight of Budapest during the
Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—
encouraging the Hungarian Revolution
without any serious thought of ever supporting it. This would not have been so
painful had not 96 percent of all Hungarians, most of whom ravenously devoured the RFE reports, thought that the
United States would provide unlimited
support for the revolution.
This account certainly warrants reading
by history buffs and public policy makers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing
the day-by-day accounts of the action in
Budapest that makes for an easy read.
However, the reader is left with a series
of provocative questions. What made the
Soviet politburo overturn its decision
and ultimately send in tanks to Hungary? Was Washington capable of focusing on more than one flash point at a
time? Would at least one fluent
Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hungary have made a difference in U.S. policy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati
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is not short of hindsight on any of these
questions.
TOM FEDYSZYN
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Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as
professor of history at the Army Command and General Staff College. He
now offers a complete history of the political, diplomatic, and military factors
leading to President Harry S. Truman’s
April 1951 firing of General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far
East. A presentation at times overdone
for general readers, this scholarly work
will interest those who specialize in
American strategic and diplomatic decision making from post–World War II
through the Korean War.
Problems between Truman and his
viceroy in Asia began early in the Korean War. In August 1950 Truman ordered MacArthur to rescind a public
statement sent to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in
which MacArthur advocated preserving
Taiwan for a future attack on mainland
China. This statement was in direct
conflict with White House policy to
keep the war in Korea limited.
Late in December 1950, after the Chinese attacked across the Yalu River in
Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint
Chiefs of Staff message with a
counterproposal. He advocated these
decisive destructive blows: a blockade
of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of
Chinese industrial capacities to wage
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